Marine Superintendent Christopher Bailey
~Lacked safety gear, missing stability certificates, unverified repairs~
GEORGETOWN, Guyana--Revelations before the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the July 18, 2026 "MV Barima" maritime disaster reached an eyebrow-raising peak on Tuesday as Marine Superintendent Bailey conceded under hours of questioning that the ill-fated vessel was unsafe to operate, detailing that the boat lacked safety gear among other deficiencies.
Testifying before the panel of commissioners at the Arthur Chung Conference Centre, including Chairperson Godfrey Smith, Commissioner Nyree Alphonso, Commissioner Jasionowski, and Captain Hamada Fouda, Bailey was forced to account for a three-page inspection report he produced in November 2025 after examining the vessel.
Marine Superintendent admits "MV Barima" had flaws
The inquiry dissected the findings line by line, exposing a vessel riddled with critical defects that was nevertheless permitted to return to passenger service without verification that a single hazard had been rectified.
“Unsafe to Operate” – The November 2025 findings:
Commissioners focused heavily on Bailey’s November 2025 report, forcing the Marine Superintendent to confirm a comprehensive list of missing, expired, and non-functional gear on board the "MV Barima". Under questioning, Bailey verified the findings, “No crane documentation, no radar, no AIS, no stability data, no EPIRB, none of the required certificates except for two, no distress signal capability, no serviceable life raft, insufficient life rafts, no emergency generator, and no fixed power-driven fire pump.”
When asked whether a ship presenting such a profile could be considered fit for service, Bailey initially demurred. “The vessel wasn’t operating, so I can’t say if it was safe or unsafe,” he told the commission. However, Commissioners refused to accept the distinction between a vessel undergoing maintenance and the objective technical profile documented in his official paperwork.
“I’m saying with this kind of information on a report, would you consider this a vessel that’s safe to operate?” Commissioner Pritchard pressed. “No, those deficiencies would need to be cleared,” Bailey admitted. “So it would be unsafe to operate?” “Yeah… Yes.”
Despite logging these hazards in November 2025, Bailey acknowledged that he wasn’t aware a 2024 inspection on the same vessel had yielded identical deficiencies. “Before commencing the inspection, I did not review previous inspection documents,” Bailey testified, adding, “I was instructed, it was to do a follow-up inspection on board the vessel.” When asked if it would have been prudent to consult prior reports to know what he was following up on, Bailey conceded, “Correct.”
Fatal math on life rafts and Emergency gear:
Captain Hamada Fouda subjected Bailey to a detailed technical examination regarding the vessel’s emergency equipment, exposing staggering mathematical and operational shortfalls in life-saving appliances.
Bailey’s report logged six life rafts on board, each with a capacity of 25 persons, providing total accommodation for 150 people. However, based on the vessel’s passenger complement and crew total of 12, international maritime standards (SOLAS) require 100 percent life-raft capacity on each side of the vessel to account for listing during a catastrophic emergency, requiring total raft capacity for at least 274 persons. “That is mean you have five life rafts missing,” Captain Fouda calculated. “If I have six, I need in addition to these six, I need five. Am I correct?” “Yes, sir,” Bailey conceded.
Captain Fouda further pressed Bailey on the total absence of distress signals and proper emergency gear. The inspection report contained completely blank entries for hand flares, parachute flares, smoke signals, and flare guns. Bailey acknowledged that no distress signaling devices were present. The vessel contained five fire extinguishers, two in the wheelhouse and three in the engine room, with zero extinguishers present in passenger accommodation spaces. No fireman’s outfits or fire suits were on board, and the main power-driven fire pump was inoperable, replaced by an unapproved portable unit. Regarding life jackets, while 240 adult and 34 child life jackets were present, none were fitted with mandatory location lights. “All life jackets without light,” Bailey confirmed. Furthermore, Bailey testified that the jackets were stored in overhead shelves roughly five feet high. When asked if a child or short person could reach them in a sudden crisis, Bailey replied, “No, ma’am.” Bailey’s report further noted that the ferry was operating with one engine broken down and one running. Captain Fouda challenged the feasibility of navigating a twin-screw vessel on a single engine, noting that asymmetric thrust forces the vessel continuously toward port or starboard. “If the helmsman not professional, he cannot control it,” Fouda stated. “That is correct,” Bailey agreed.
Incomplete visual check and unverified repairs:
The inquiry also revealed that Bailey’s November 2025 walk-through of the vessel lasted only 45 minutes to an hour, during which he failed to inspect critical structural compartments.
Under questioning, Bailey admitted he visually inspected only one cargo hold forward and entered the engine room, but completely failed to inspect the aft cargo hold or the aft watertight bulkhead. “No, I didn’t enter that space,” Bailey acknowledged, despite having ticked the report indicating that watertight bulkheads were in satisfactory condition.
Finally, the commission laid bare MARAD’s complete failure to enforce rectification measures. Bailey explained that once an inspector logs deficiencies, the report is submitted to the Director of Safety, Captain McDonald, who then transmits the findings to the Transport and Harbours Department (THD). THD is expected to rectify the defects, notify MARAD in writing, and request a re-inspection.
However, Bailey admitted under oath that after filing his November 2025 report containing 16 major safety deficiencies, no follow-up was ever conducted, no written clearance was ever received from THD, and he was never instructed to return to the "MV Barima" to verify that a single defect had been rectified. “Has any one of the ferries that you inspected, including Barima, ever been re-inspected to check for those deficiencies, rectification measures?” Commissioner Jasionowski asked. “No, sir,” Bailey answered. ~Kaieteur News~
